‘Minorities’ have an inalienable
claim on Pakistani nationalism—a spiritual-ethnic identity on a modernising
quest
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The
further we move on from March 23, 1940—and from December 16, 1971, when the
original Pakistan disintegrated—the stronger and deeper, and at the same time,
more stressful, becomes the search for a cohesive sense of Pakistani
nationalism.
Composed
of several elements, Muslim identity is the prime driver of Pakistani
nationalism, but not exclusively so. Non-Muslim identities are small, yet vital
and intrinsic parts of Pakistani nationalism. Foremost among them are Pakistani
Hindu and Buddhist citizens. In a foundational sense, Pakistani Hindus and
Buddhists are the oldest Pakistanis. Their ancestors have lived upon the lands
that constitute our territory for centuries before the first Muslims arrived,
or before the first local was converted to Islam.
If
roots in territory make people eligible to be regarded as ‘sons of the soil’,
then these non-Muslims are the first sons and daughters of Pakistan. It is
unfortunate that, in the name of a state entity created less than 70 years ago,
peoples whose ancestors have lived on these very territories for over 7,000
years are now ‘minorities’. Worse, many of them are regarded (and regard
themselves) as second-class citizens. Adherents of all non-Islamic faiths are
ineligible, by virtue of their religion, to be elected president or prime
minister. This is so despite the fact that Article 20 of the Constitution
grants—subject to law, public order and morality—freedom to profess religion
and to manage religious institutions. Article 25, which deals with citizens’
equality says, in part: “All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to
equal protection of law.” This is further reinforced by Article 36, which
obliges the state to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of
minorities, including their due representation in the federal and provincial
services.
Working
with Hindus, Christians and Zoroastrians for over 30 years in remote areas and
in urban centres, this writer has first-hand experience of their attitudes and
actions. These non-Muslim Pakistanis have a deep love for Pakistan. They are
proud Pakistanis, and contribute abundantly to the country’s progress—and
little to its problems! Yet Pakistani Hindus are often regarded by segments of
the state and society as Indian ‘agents’ or as being inherently disloyal to
Pakistan. Such suspicion is a profanity in itself.
However,
this does not prevent non-Muslim Pakistanis from rendering notable roles in all
areas, from agriculture, business and law to education, diplomacy and politics.
Non-Muslim
Pakistanis comprise only about three per cent of the population but symbolise
at least 30 per cent of Pakistani nationalism. This disproportionately large
presence in the nation’s persona reflects the vision of Qaid-e-Azam. Jinnah
strongly opposed the partition of Punjab and Bengal. He wanted non-Muslim
residents of these provinces to stay on and become Pakistanis. In May 1947,
three months before Independence, he made a fervent appeal to Attlee to reject
the Mountbatten and Congress plan to divide these two provinces. He wanted a
Pakistan shaped by Muslim aspirations and balanced with the pluralism of other
faiths.
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If
religion and inherited affinity with territory are two of the initial
constituent elements of Pakistani nationalism, the children and grandchildren
of the 10 million-plus Muslims who migrated to West Pakistan in 1947 and thereafter
from other parts of South Asia have also, over the past 65 years, developed an
intense affection for Pakistan. The migrant element is thus a potent factor in
the formation of Pakistani nationalism. Using the term ‘Pakistaniat’ as an
expression of our country’s nationalism, this writer’s most recent book— Pakistan:
Identity and Destiny—offers 15 elements that define Pakistani nationalism.
As
a condition of identity, nationalism is a combination of fixed and fluid
elements. In older nations such as Egypt, Turkey, China, Iran and Greece, parts
of their respective personas are rooted in unchanging geography, language,
ethnicity and shared memories. Other facets there are continually evolving as
objective conditions change.
The
search for Pakistani nationalism began unconsciously, when the first Muslim
stepped onto the soil of South Asia over 1,200 years ago. Perhaps the search
softened and was absorbed in other things for about 1,000 years as Muslims
ruled parts of the region. Then came the failed revolt of 1857 and the fallout
therefrom. Muslims faced the prospect of being non-rulers for the first time in
about a millennium. They felt further weakened by an emerging nexus between the
British and a Hindu majority.
K.K.
Aziz, the eminent Pakistani historian, wrote in his book A History of the
Idea of Pakistan that, between 1858 and 1940, there are 170 milestones in
the evolution of the concept of a State shaped by Muslim nationalism. He lists
the first step, ironically, not with a South Asian personality but with the
speech made by a British MP in London. On June 24, 1858, John Bright surveyed
the aftermath of the overthrow of Mughal rule. He visualised that British
rule would eventually have to be replaced by “...five or six large
presidencies with complete autonomy, ultimately becoming independent”.
Eighty-two
years after that prescient observation came the Lahore resolution, introduced
on March 23 and formally adopted on March 24, 1940. Yet, just six years later
came the next turning point. A meeting of Muslim League legislators in 1946
asserted that their demand was for a single Muslim nation-state and not several
states, as ambiguously inferred from the Lahore resolution’s text.
With
the creation of the first version of Pakistan in 1947 and the survival of West
Pakistan onwards of December 1971 come the next two milestones. The formation
of Bangladesh represented the rejection of the state structure of the original
Pakistan, but not the rejection of the two-nation theory. The large majority of
Bangladeshis remain proud of their Bengali Muslim identity. They have no desire
to merge themselves into an Indian West Bengal.
The
preamble of the Constitution of Bangladesh refers to the “pledge (that) the
high ideals and absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah” will guide the
nation. Though the state is titled ‘The People’s Republic of Bangladesh’
(unlike Pakistan, which calls itself ‘The Islamic Republic of Pakistan’), its
constitution says: “The state religion of Bangladesh is Islam but other
religions may be practised in peace and harmony in Bangladesh”. Article 25
deals with the promotion of international peace and solidarity. Subclause (2)
says: “The state shall endeavour to consolidate, preserve and strengthen
fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.”
On
December 16, 1971, the ‘two nation-two state’ theory became the ‘two
nation-three state’ theory. Predominantly Muslim Pakistan. Slightly less
predominantly Muslim Bangladesh. And approximately numerically equal Muslims
(comprised of diverse ethnicities) willing to live with a Hindu majority in
India.
Separated,
yet in parallel ways, Pakistan and Bangladesh entered the next phase of the
search for sovereign, autonomous Muslim nationalism in South Asia. Due to its
ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, Bangladesh does not face the
supra-nation-building tasks that face Pakistan.
The
assertion of the identity and rights of the several nations/sub-nations that
exist in Pakistan—belatedly recognised by the 18th Amendment—strengthens rather
than weakens Pakistani nationalism. Like other nationalisms—which, in turn,
comprise a variety of identities—the ideal of Pakistani nationalism has the
capacity to sustain and enrich diverse internal nations. But only if the
distinct national identities of Baloch, Brahui, Pakhtoon, Hazara, Punjabi,
Seraiki, Sindhi and others are given due respect. Other, older nation-states
struggle to contain diverse nationalisms. After centuries of democratic
coexistence, many people in Scotland want to secede from the United Kingdom.
The
relationship between the evolution of the Pakistani nation and the Pakistani
state is marked by parallel trajectories of internal conflict between their
constituent elements. Even though, on the face of it, both suffered a
fundamental negation with the secession of East Pakistan, the search for a more
coherent nationalism and the struggle to secure a stable state vigorously
continue in 2013.
The
challenges facing the search for Pakistani nationalism in the 21st century are
multi-dimensional. They include the quest for a peacefully coexisting mosaic
of nations and communities within the supra-concept of Pakistan based on
equity and justice. They include the test of whether a historically strong
centre can be safely deconstructed, while retaining strong, merit-based
armed forces that do not intervene politically, gradually cede influence in
foreign policy and cease covert interference in internal conflicts.
The
primary wellsprings of Pakistani nationalism are spiritual-cerebral, not
ethnic-linguistic. For these two contrasting sources of shared identity to
converge, or learn to stably coexist, it will take more, possibly
indeterminate, time.
As
we fondly remember the Lahore resolution, let us prevent extremist hate against
the ‘other’. Let us enforce respect for our splendid diversity as the finest
guarantee of our survival and progress.
(Writer
and film-maker Javed Jabbar is a former senator and information minister of
Pakistan. His latest book is Pakistan: Identity and Destiny.)
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